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We compare the ideological balance of the legal academy to the ideological
balance of the legal profession. To do so, we match professors listed
in the Association of American Law Schools Directory of Law Teachers
and lawyers listed in the Martindale-Hubbell directory to a measure of
political ideology based on political donations. We find that 15% of law
professors, compared to 35% of lawyers, are conservative. After controlling
for individual characteristics, however, this 20 percentage point ideological
gap narrows to around 13 percentage points. We argue that this ideological
uniformity marginalizes law professors, but that it may not be possible to
improve the ideological balance of the legal academy without sacrificing
other values.
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Introduction
Political ideology affects legal decision-making. For example, political ideol-

ogy affects the voting of Supreme Court justices (Segal and Spaeth, 2002), influences
the voting patterns of heterogeneous circuit court panels (Miles and Sunstein, 2007),
and even predicts the conclusions that law professors reach in their research (Chilton
and Posner, 2015). In fact, the relationship between ideology and legal decision-making
is thought to be so strong and persistent that it is now widely believed to be one of the
most influential factors in legal decisions (e.g., Martin et al., 2004; Ruger et al., 2004).
The relationship between ideology and legal decision-making has given rise
to concerns over the ideological balance in the legal academy, and, in particular, the implications stemming from an underrepresentation of conservatives. The strong link between ideology and legal decision-making implies that law professors, who are charged
with training future generations of lawyers and who exercise substantial influence over
politics and policy, should not be overwhelmingly from one side of the political spectrum. Concerns about the ideological imbalance of the legal academy have recently
drawn attention from both academics and politicians. For example, a group of law professors have petitioned the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) to promote
more ideological diversity in the legal academy (Barnett, 2017), and bills have been
introduced into two state legislatures—Iowa and North Carolina—that would require
public universities to promote ideological diversity in faculty hiring (Schmidt, 2017).
The belief that law professors are predominantly liberal is not only based
on anecdotal evidence, but also has been documented in a number of empirical studies (Merritt, 1998; Cardiff and Klein, 2005; McGinnis et al., 2005; Lindgren, 2016;
Phillips, 2016). Although these studies made important contributions, they examined
the ideologies of law professors in isolation. However, the assessment of the ideological
balance of the legal academy should consider the ideological distribution of the population of potential law professors. Because lawyers—and particularly elite lawyers—are
also overwhelmingly liberal (Bonica et al., 2016), it may be the case that law professors
simply share the political ideology of the population from which they are drawn.
In this paper, we study the ideological balance of the legal academy relative
to the legal profession. To do so, we construct the most comprehensive dataset on
the ideologies of law professors by matching 10,040 law professors listed in the 2012
AALS Directory of Law Teachers to the Database on Ideology, Money and Politics,
1
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and Elections (DIME) (Bonica, 2016), a comprehensive database of political ideology
that is based on political donations, and compare the ideologies of law professors to
the ideologies of lawyers listed in the Martindale-Hubbell directory. This process reveals that law professors are politically active, with over 60% having made a political
donation between 1979 and 2014.
We begin by documenting the ideologies of law professors. We find that
approximately 15% of law professors are conservative and that only approximately one
out of every twenty law schools have more conservative law professors than liberal ones.
In addition, we find that these patterns vary, with higher-ranked schools having an
even smaller presence of conservative law professors. We then compare the ideological
balance of the legal academy to that of the legal profession. Compared to the 15%
of law professors that are conservative, 35% of lawyers overall are conservative. Law
professors are more liberal than graduates of top 14 law schools, lawyers working at
the largest law firms, former federal law clerks, and federal judges. Although we find
that professors are more liberal than the alumni at all but a handful of law schools,
there is a strong relationship between the ideologies of professors from a law school
and the ideologies of alumni from that school. However, this relationship is weaker for
schools with more conservative alumni.
Next, we formally compare the ideological balance of the legal academy to
relevant groups of lawyers by estimating a series of regressions that control for differences in ideologies between law professors and lawyers by law school, subject area, and
geographic location. We find that the legal academy is more liberal than the legal profession even after controlling for these individual characteristics. However, we find that
differences in ideology attributable to individual characteristics explain a meaningful
amount of the ideological gap between the legal academy and the legal profession. In
particular, the ideological gap between law professors and lawyers is reduced by roughly
one third (from 20 percentage points to 13 percentage points).
Nonetheless, the ideological tilt of the legal academy has potentially broad
implications. For instance, because law professors are overwhelmingly liberal, groups of
law professors advocating for liberal positions can easily be marginalized. For example,
after Jeff Sessions was nominated as Attorney General in 2016, over a thousand law
professors signed a letter opposing his confirmation. This letter was criticized by some
as simply representing the views of the left leaning legal academy (e.g., Huffman, 2017;
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Presser, 2017). To assess the these criticisms, we match the signatories of the letter
to our sample of law professor ideology, and find that only 4% of the signatories that
appear in our data are conservative. This raises the question of whether the reception
to the letter would have been different had more conservative law professors signed the
letter. Although we have no way to answer this question, the endeavor might have
been given more credence had more conservative professors participated in the letter:
observers might have been less likely to expect Republican-leaning law professors to
oppose Sessions ideologically, thus making such criticisms more powerful and effective.
We argue that this example illustrates that the legal academy’s ideological uniformity
limits its political credibility.
As we will explain, however, reducing the ideological uniformity of the legal
academy may have drawbacks. For instance, adopting ideological hiring preferences—
like promoting the hiring of conservative faculty—could negatively affect other hiring
prerogatives, including the goal of achieving a gender balance and the priority of hiring
underrepresented racial groups. We consider the potential tradeoffs between ideological
hiring preferences and other hiring prerogatives by using information on the gender of
law professors and an AALS list of 1,417 minority law professors. In particular, we
assess ideological differences by gender and minority status, and find that non-minority
(male) law professors are roughly one and a half times (two times) more likely to
be conservative than minority (female) law professors. This provides at least some
suggestive evidence that a tradeoff between ideological balance and diversity-oriented
hiring prerogatives could potentially exist.
At the outset, it is worth emphasizing that our results are purely descriptive.
We do not attempt to study the causes or consequences of the empirical patterns. As
a result, we are not able to shed light on why the liberal tilt in the legal academy
exists or whether the ideological leanings of the legal academy have any adverse effect
on student outcomes, scholarship, or policy making. For example, it could be the case
that ideological sorting leads more liberals to pursue a career in the legal academy. Or,
as has been noted by several scholars (e.g., Phillips, 2016), it could partly be explained
by conservative candidates facing obstacles in the hiring process. These and other
narratives could work together to create the observed empirical patterns. We discuss
potential explanations in further depth below, but again emphasize here that we are
unable to tease out any of the mechanisms.
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Our paper proceeds as follows. In Part 2 we introduce the data. In Part 3 we
study the ideologies of law professors overall, by expertise, and by law school. In Part
4 we study the ideological balance between the legal academy and the legal profession.
In Part 5 we implement some robustness checks. In Part 6 we document one possible
consequence of the lack of ideological diversity: limiting the persuasiveness of attempts
by law professors to collectively influence public opinion. In Part 7 we explore how an
ideological hiring preference might potentially affect the balance of law professor hiring
on other diversity margins. In Part 8 we conclude.

2

Data

2.1

Prior Studies
At least five prior studies investigate the political ideologies of law profes-

sors.1 Table 1 summarizes the ideologies of law professors estimated from each study.
Although these papers used different samples and methods for identifying political ideology, all five studies found that between 75% and 86% of law professors are liberal.2
As we further explain below, the data we use for this study improve upon
past work in three ways. First, whereas other studies use relatively small samples
of law professors (e.g., from a subset of law schools), our data is based on all law
professors listed in the 2012 AALS Directory of Law Teachers. Second, our measure of
political ideology—the CFscore—places individuals on an ideological spectrum, which
offers richer information on individuals’ political leanings than using a discrete measure
of ideology as in previous studies (e.g., the political party one donates to). Third, we
link data on the ideologies of law professors to data on the ideologies of lawyers, which
allows us to compare the ideology of the legal academy to the legal profession.

1

In addition to these studies, two other studies have indirectly examined the ideologies of law
professors. First, Chilton and Posner (2015) examined the relationship between political ideology
and the political leanings of legal scholarship using a sample of 156 law professors from the top-14
law schools. They found that 75 professors were net donors to Democrats, 24 professors were net
donors to Republicans, and 57 professors made no donations. Second, Bonica et al. (2016) examined
the political ideologies of lawyers in the Martindale-Hubbell directory. They found that lawyers who
identified as law professors were more liberal than other lawyers.
2
See Phillips (2016) for a great summary of these studies.
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2.2

AALS
We obtained the names of all law professors recorded in the 2012 AALS

Directory of Law Teachers.3 The AALS contains multiple tables of law professor identities. We utilize the table of “law teachers by subject” for our list of law professors.
This means we intentionally exclude anyone who is not listed as teaching at least one
subject (e.g., director of alumni relations, head of student services). This yields 10,040
law professors in total. The AALS further identifies the law school where the professor
is employed and each subject that he or she teaches. There are a total of 104 subjects,4
and the average professor teaches 3.9 subjects.
2.3

DIME
We use data on political ideology from the Database on Ideology, Money

in Politics, and Elections (DIME) (Bonica, 2016). This database was introduced in
Bonica (2014). To give some brief context, the DIME contains information on the
universe of political donations disclosed to the Federal Election Commission and state
election agencies. This includes donations made from 1979 to 2014 in local, state, and
federal elections by individuals, political action committees, and corporations. In total,
the DIME contains over 150 million donations made from over 16 million donors.
The DIME provides a measure of ideology known as Campaign Finance
scores (“CFscores”). CFscores are calculated by first placing candidates on a unidimensional ideological scale based on their share of common donors. Individual donors
are then placed on the same scale based on the weighted share of the donations given
to candidates. The scale is normalized such that it has a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one with respect to the population of U.S. donors.5 For instance, Bernie
Sanders has a CFscore of -1.89, Barak Obama has a CFscore of -1.16, Mitt Romney
has a CFscore of 0.90, and Donald Trump has a CFscore of 1.29. To offer a slightly
simplified illustration of how the donor scores are constructed, consider two examples.
First, if an individual’s only donation is to Barak Obama, her CFscore would be -1.16.
3

Several earlier studies have relied on AALS data (e.g., White, 1994; Olivas, 1994; Eisenberg and
Wells, 2000; Harrison, 2006). We relied on the 2012 AALS because this was the most recent version
of the directory in PDF form when we began data collection for this project.
4
We exclude subjects that have fewer than 10 law professors.
5
This measure has been extensively validated (Bonica, 2014; Bonica and Sen, 2015) and used
in political science and legal research (e.g., Thomsen, 2014; Chilton and Posner, 2015; Wood and
Spencer, 2016).
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Second, if an individual made two thirds of her lifetime donations to Bernie Sanders
and one third of her lifetime donations to Barak Obama, her CFscore would be -1.65

(-1.89 × 23 ) + (-1.16 × 31 ) .
2.4

Matching
We use the professor’s name, the law school they work at, and the law school’s

location to match to DIME. In addition to the data on law professor identities, we
obtained data on the identities of lawyers from the Martindale-Hubbell directory. To
match these data to DIME, we use the lawyer’s name, employer, and the state of
residence from the Martindale-Hubbell directory of lawyers.6 Through this process
we find that the donation rate for law professors is 64%. (To put this in perspective,
Chilton and Posner (2015) hand matched professors from Top 14 law schools to their
donations and found donation rates of 63%.) This donations rate is higher than the
donation rate for Americans in general (roughly 5%) and for lawyers in the MartindaleHubbell directory (41%).

3

The Ideology of the Legal Academy
In this section, we assess several potentially important patterns of law pro-

fessor ideologies, including variation by area of expertise and across law schools. We
begin by exploring the overall distribution of law professors’ ideologies.
3.1

Ideologies of Law Professors Overall
Figure 1 displays the distribution of the CFscores for all 6,441 law professors

who made donations (prominent politicians’ CFScores are marked for reference). The
distribution is roughly bimodal, following the two-party ideological divide in American
politics. The average CFscore of donating professors is -0.86, which is roughly between
Bill Clinton (-0.56) and Barack Obama (-1.16).
Using a cutoff for conservative as 0 (which reflects the average ideology of
Americans), 15% of law professors are conservative. If we define “moderate conservative” as between 0 and 1, 54% of conservative professors are moderate conservative.
If we define “moderate liberal” as between -1 and 0, 27% of liberal professors are
6

See Bonica and Sen (2015) for information on the matching process.
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moderate liberal. We will use these definitions of moderate conservative and liberal
throughout.
3.2

Ideologies of Law Professors by Area of Expertise
Next, we examine whether the ideologies of law professors vary according

to their substantive academic interests. One might expect political ideology to stem
from, or perhaps serve to motivate, law professors’ research and teaching activities. For
example, a researcher interested in racial bias could develop an interest in voting rights
more broadly, thereby leading her to more strongly affiliate with (and thus contribute
to) liberal candidates.
We examine this possible relationship by assessing how the ideologies of law
professors vary according to their subject areas, as listed in the AALS directory.7 Figure
2 plots the mean (“x” symbol) and median (“o” symbol) ideologies of law professors
in each of the subject areas (with the bars indicating the 25th and 75th percentile of
CFscores). The teaching areas are sorted by the mean CFscore of professors in the
subject area from most liberal (“feminist legal theory”) to most conservative (“military
law”). Some of the subjects that have a reputation for being the most liberal are taught
by, on average, the most liberal professors. For example, the eight most liberal subjects
in terms of mean CFscore are feminist legal theory, poverty law, women and the law,
critical race theory, immigration law, disability law, welfare law, and human rights. By
contrast, subjects with the most conservative professors on average are military law,
estate planning, oil and gas, securities regulation, admiralty, sports law, and equity.
To investigate the forces driving the differences, Figure 3 plots the distribution of CFscores for subject areas with at least 200 professors who donate (the vertical
line represents the median CFscore for the subject area). The figure shows that a
key difference between the ideologies of law professors by subject is not a noticeable
shift from liberal professors to moderate liberal professors, but the presence, if any, of
conservative professors in the field. Figure 3 shows that there are few conservative professors teaching in the subjects that are most liberal on average; by contrast, subjects
that are more conservative on average have a majority of liberal professors but at least
7

Subject area refers to “subject matter taught,” which could differ from research and writing
areas. For the most part, scholars tend to teach in areas close to or tangential to their research areas.
In addition, recall that professors may have multiple teaching areas listed. The means we include each
individual professor into each subjects area listed.
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some conservative professors. Thus, the mere presence of a number of conservatives
is sufficient to differentiate (in terms of averages) ideological differences among law
professors between subject areas.
3.3

Ideologies of Law Professors by Law School
We anticipate that some of the greatest variation in the ideologies of law

professors will be across law schools. Law schools have different ideological cultures,
with differences in the ideologies of alumni comporting with the popular reputations of
the programs (Bonica et al., 2016). For instance, alumni of the University of CaliforniaBerkeley are some of the most liberal lawyers, while graduates of Brigham Young
University and the University of Wyoming are some of the most conservative.
One might expect the reputations to extend to the professors at the law
schools. To investigate differences in ideology by law school, Figure 4 plots the mean
(“x” symbol) and median (“o” symbol) professor CFscore for each law school (with
bars indicating the 25th and 75th percentile of CFscores). For ease of interpretation,
we sort the programs by the mean professor CFscore, from most liberal (Florida A&M
University) to the most conservative (George Mason University). We find that universities with liberal reputations, such as the University of California-Berkeley, have on
average the most liberal professors and that universities with conservative reputations,
such as George Mason University and Brigham Young University, have on average the
most conservative professors. The figure also makes clear that the vast majority of law
schools have average faculty that leans to the left of center. The average professor is
more conservative than the average American at less than ten law schools.8
We next consider whether the difference in average professor ideology by law
school is driven by the absence of conservative professors or by more moderate liberal
professors. Figure 5 plots the ideological distribution of the professors at the most elite
law schools—traditionally known as the “T14” (or the Top 14) law schools. Differences
in ideology appear to be driven by the presence of conservatives at several programs
rather than a shift of liberals in the moderate direction. For example, consider the
law schools at the University of Virginia and Northwestern University, which we find
to be on average more conservative than similarly ranked programs such as the law
8

In the Appendix, Figure A1 provides a figure inspired by McGinnis et al. (2005) that shows the
number of liberals and conservatives, as defined by a threshold CFscore of 0, for each of the top 50
ranked law schools.
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schools at the University of Michigan or the University of Pennsylvania. Figure 5 shows
that the liberal professors at the University of Virginia and Northwestern University
ideologically resemble the professors at other institutions; however, these two programs
differ in that they have relatively more conservative professors.
3.4

Ideologies of Law Professors by Law School Ranking
Next, we explore the relationship between ideology and law school rank. Fig-

ure 6 shows a binscatter of the relationship between the average ideology of professors
at a school and law school rank.9 The figure shows a clear negative relationship between mean professor CFscore and law school prestige; that is, the more prestigious
the program (the closer its rank is to “1”) the more liberal (negative) the average
professor is at the law school. To assess the relationship more formally, we fit onto
the scatterplot a linear regression line: the slope of the plotted line indicates that law
schools ranked 30 spots higher are associated with a 0.04 shift in CFscore to the left
(p < 0.01).
The difference in average professor ideology by law school could be driven
by two channels. First, polarization could be different at higher-ranked schools (i.e.,
liberal professors at top schools could be more liberal, or conservatives at top law
schools could be more moderate). Second, there could be relatively fewer conservatives
at higher-ranked law schools. We explore the extent to which these channels explain
the relationship between average ideology and rank in Figure 7. Panel A explores the
polarization channel. In particular, we divide law professors at each law school into
liberals and conservatives and plot the mean ideology within the liberal or conservative
professors against law school rank. We find no evidence that differences in polarization
is driving the relationship between ideology and law school rank.
Panel B of Figure 7 explores the second channel, the presence of conservative
law professors. It plots the relationship between law school rank and the proportion of
conservative professors at a law school. The negative relationship suggests that higherranked law schools have a lower share of conservative professors. Law schools ranked
of 30 spots higher are associated with a 2ppt decrease in the proportion of conservative
professors (p < 0.01).
In sum, we find evidence that the relationship between professor ideology
9

We obtain law school rank in 2012 from the U.S. News and World Report ranking.
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and law school rank is driven through the presence of fewer conservative professors
at higher-ranked schools rather than a shift of liberal law professors in a more liberal
direction.
3.5

Ideologies of Law Professors by their Alma Mater Law School
In later sections of this paper, we address the extent that law professors differ

from lawyers. For now, we give some context on the importance of this question by
presenting descriptive statistics for law professors by which law schools they attended.
(We do so for professors whom we were able to identify law school attended in the
biography section of the 2012 AALS.) Table 2 presents this information. Column 1
reports the market share for each of the top 14 law schools. Harvard ranks first with
12% of professors having attended its law school. Only Yale Law School has a market
share close to Harvard’s (9%). Each of the other law schools account for less than half
of Yale’s market share. In total, roughly a third of legal academic positions are held
by graduates of the five top law schools, and roughly half (49%) of academic positions
are held by graduates of the top 14 law schools.
Columns (2) and (3) show how the ideologies of law professors vary by law
school attended. Eighteen percent of law professors from non-top 14 law schools are
conservative, compared to 12% of law professors from top 14 law schools (not shown).
Within professors from the top 14 law schools, there are noticeable differences in the
average ideology of law professors and the proportion of conservative law professors.
Law professors that attended New York University are the most liberal law professors
both in terms mean ideology (-1.06) and in terms of the proportion of conservatives
(9%), and law professors that attended Duke and the University of Chicago are the
most conservative (mean CFscore of -0.64 and -0.72, and 22% and 21% conservative,
respectively). These differences highlight the importance of controlling for where law
professors went to law school in assessing ideological differences between the legal
academy and the legal profession.
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4

The Ideology of the Legal Academy Compared to the Legal
Profession
The previous section documented a leftward tendency among law professors,

one that becomes more pronounced at the most prestigious law schools. However, a key
question concerns context. How do law professors compare to other lawyers, including
alumni of their law schools or lawyers in the their area of expertise? On the one hand, if
the ideologies of law professors correspond closely with the ideologies of other (similar)
lawyers, then perhaps little reason exists to think that law professors are ideologically
out of step with the profession. On the other hand, a large gap between the ideologies
of law professors and the ideologies of similar lawyers would indeed suggest that law
professors are ideologically out of step with the profession. In this section, we study
whether the legal academy is ideologically out of balance with the legal profession
by examining how the ideologies of law professors compare to: (1) lawyers; (2) elite
lawyers, including graduates of elite law schools; (3) lawyers in the same practice area;
and (4) lawyers who are alumni of the law professors’s program.
4.1

Ideologies of Law Professors Compared to Lawyers
First, we assess how the ideologies of law professors compare to the ideologies

of lawyers more generally.10 Figure 8 plots the ideological distribution of law professors
(solid line) along with the distribution for lawyers (dash line). Law professors are
significantly more liberal on average than lawyers overall (CFscore of -0.84 compared
to -0.31).
There are several additional substantive findings. First, there are relatively
fewer conservative law professors than conservative lawyers.11 Second, differences at
the tails of the distribution suggest that law professors hold more extreme political
views than lawyers. For example, compared to the 61% of liberal lawyers who are
10

For an overview of the ideological leanings of the professional bar, see Bonica et al. (2016). We
note that law professors tend to donate at higher rates than do lawyers at large—64% compared to
41%. This means that law professors are more likely to be selected into our data than are lawyers.
Possible problems associated with selection bias within the bar as a whole are discussed in Bonica
et al. (2016); as that paper shows, we have no reason to think that differences in contributions rates
would be correlated with ideology in a way that would bias any inferences about these populations.
11
See Bonica et al. (2016) for a comparison of lawyers to other similarly educated professions, which
shows that lawyers are more liberal than accountants, workers in the finance industry, and doctors,
but more conservative overall than journalists and high-tech sector workers.
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moderate liberal (CFscore of between -1 and 0), 27% of liberal law professors are
moderate liberal. Compared to the 76% of conservative lawyers who are moderate
conservative (CFscore of between 0 and 1), only 54% of conservative law professors
are moderate conservative. Both these differences in means are statistically significant
(p<0.01).12
4.2

Ideologies of Law Professors Compared to Elite Lawyers and Other
Academics
Law professors are among the most elite of lawyers and tend to have pres-

tigious educational and professional backgrounds (Presser, 2016). For example, many
law professors are alumni of the top-ranked law schools, have served as Supreme Court
or court of appeals law clerks, and/or have doctoral degrees. To provide a better comparison set, we therefore compare law professors to three subsets of lawyers: alumni
of top 14 programs and lawyers at the 100 largest law firms by number of attorneys
(“Biglaw”); federal law clerks; and federal judges. We also provide a comparison to
one other important group: academics in other (non-law) disciplines.
Comparison to Top 14 Alumni and Big Firm Lawyers. We first compare law
professors to alumni of the top 14 programs and to lawyers in Biglaw.13 Panel A of
Figure 9 plots the ideologies of top 14 alumni and Biglaw lawyers against the ideologies
of law professors. The average CFscore for lawyers from top 14 law schools is -0.55 and
-0.42 for lawyers in Biglaw, compared to -0.86 for law professors. Additionally, 25%
of alumni from top 14 law schools and 30% of lawyers from Biglaw are conservative
(compared to 15% of law professors). In short, top alumni and lawyers in Biglaw are
more liberal than lawyers overall, but law professors are more liberal still.

12

Throughout the draft, we at times test the differences in means between groups. We note that we
have also statistically compared distributions via a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnof (KS) test, and
the statistical significance of the primary results hold under the KS test as well (meaning that we can
rule out the null hypothesis that the two samples come from the same underlying population). Even
though the KS test has the advantage of making no assumptions about the underlying distribution
of the data (unlike the t-test for differences in means), in our setting we view the tests largely as
alternatives. We therefore only report the t-test results for simplicity’s sake.
13
We determine whether a lawyer worked for a Biglaw firm via his or her entry in the MartindaleHubbelll directory.
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Comparison to Law Clerks. Next, we examine how the ideologies of law professors
compare to ideologies of lawyers who have served as judicial law clerks. Legal clerkships
are highly prestigious one- to two-year positions in which recent law alumni work closely
with judges, serving as research and writing assistants.14 For our purposes, clerkships—
in particular Supreme Court and, to a lesser extent, federal lower-court clerkships—can
serve as stepping stones into a career in legal academia.
We disaggregate our analysis by examining (1) federal district clerks and
federal court of appeals clerks, and (2) U.S. Supreme Court clerks. We use data on
district and court of appeals clerks from 1996 to 2004 from Katz and Stafford (2010) and
data on Supreme Court clerks from 1960 to 2009 from the Supreme Court Information
Office.15 To give some context, the mean CFscore for Supreme Court clerks is -0.49, and
the mean CFscore for district and court of appeals clerks is -0.63. Panel B of Figure 9
plots the ideologies of law professors against the ideologies of law clerks. Liberal law
professors resemble liberal law clerks. However, a key difference between law clerks
and law professors is the much larger density of conservative law clerks compared to
conservative law professors. Specifically, 24% of district and court of appeals clerks
are conservative, and 30% of U.S. Supreme Court clerks are conservative (compared to
15% for law professors).
Comparison to Federal Judges. The third elite peer group we examine are federal
judges. Transitioning from a career as a federal judge into a career in the academy
is unusual;16 for that reason, our focus here is to provide a comparison to a parallel
career path similar in prestige, job security, and pay to a career in the legal academy
(Posner, 2016). In addition, note that a key difference between federal judges and
law professors is that judges are, explicitly, political appointments. For that reason,
we would expect to see a divergence between the ideologies of law professors and
judges, with judges more closely following contemporary ideological cleavages between
14

For more information on the ideologies of law clerks, see Bonica et al. (2017).
Note that this means that our analysis compares law clerks from the past to law professors in
2012; this could mean overlap in terms of individuals who were law clerks during this time period but
who are now law professors.
16
We do note there are instances in which law professors have transitioned into appointments on
federal courts. Karen Nelson Moore (Sixth Circuit), Richard Posner (Seventh Circuit), and Guido
Calabresi (Second Circuit) are just a few examples. There are also instances in which federal judges
resign and enter academia—e.g., Michael McConnell (Tenth Circuit), Deanell Reece Tacha (Tenth
Circuit), and David Levi (Eastern District of California).
15

13

Democrats and Republicans.
For this analysis, we draw on data from Bonica and Sen (2017), who provide
CFscores for federal district and court of appeals judges. Note that federal judges
cannot donate once they are appointed to bench, so here we observe donations only
before the appointment. Panel C of Figure 9 plots the ideologies of law professors
against the ideologies of federal district court and court of appeals judges. Judges differ
substantially from law professors, with the former being significantly more conservative
across all tiers of the judiciary. In particular, the mean CFscore of district court
judges is -0.07, and the mean CFscore of court of appeals judges is 0.05 (-0.86 for
law professors); 45% of district court judges and 52% of court of appeals judges are
conservative (15% of law professors are conservative).
Comparison to Other Academics. The last group that we use as a comparison
group are other academics (that is, non-law school professors). We obtain this information from DIME, which contains a contributor’s employer and profession for a
subset of donors. We use this information to parse out academics, identifying 322,434
academics. Panel D of Figure 9 plots the ideologies of all academics versus the ideologies of law professors. The average CFscore for other academics is -0.92 compared to
-0.86 for law professors. The difference in means is statistically significant (p < 0.01).
Examining the data more closely suggest that there is no difference between the two
groups in terms of the presence of conservatives: both non-law and law faculties have
very few conservatives. For non-law professors, around 16% are conservative; for law
professors, 15% are conservative. However, it does seem to be the case that non-law
liberal academics are more extreme than are liberal law professors. Specifically, 19% of
liberal non-law professors are moderate liberal, but 27% of liberal law professors are.
4.3

Ideologies of Law Professors Compared to Lawyers by Subject/Practice Area
The above investigations into ideological differences between law professors

and lawyers have the potential to obscure possible ideological sorting by area of expertise. Specifically, we would expect that differences between the ideologies of professors
and of lawyers to narrow when we condition on area of expertise. To assess the extent that ideological sorting by subject or practice area could explain the differences
14

in ideologies between law professors and lawyers, we leverage additional information
from Martindale-Hubbell, which reports the practice areas of lawyers. We note that
the practice areas in the Martindale-Hubbell directory do not perfectly correspond to
the teaching areas listed by the AALS; we therefore manually coded the practice areas
into coarse areas of expertise. We then coded the AALS teaching fields into these same
areas of expertise.17 A list of all of the coarsened areas of expertise for law professor
teaching subjects and lawyer practice areas is provided in Table A1 of the Appendix.
We begin to compare lawyers and law professors by subject area in Figure 10,
which plots the mean CFscore of lawyers and law professors in the areas of expertise.
Similar to our earlier analysis, subject areas with reputations as more progressive (e.g.,
consumer protection) have on average more liberal lawyers, and subject areas with
more conservative reputations (e.g., tax) have on average more conservative lawyers.
In addition, we see a positive relationship between the ideologies of law professors and
lawyers between areas. Specifically, a one unit increase in the mean CFscore of law
professors in a field is associated with a 0.36 unit increase in the mean CFscore of
lawyers in the field (p<0.05). However, in almost every field, the average law professor
is to the left of the average lawyer.
Next, we assess the extent that the ideological distributions of law professors
and lawyers across areas of expertise are comparable. Figure 11 plots the ideological
distributions by area of expertise for law professors (solid line) and lawyers (dashed
line). The area of expertise distributions are sorted by the difference between the
median ideology of law professors and lawyers in the area (e.g., the median law professor
in trade law is more liberal than the median lawyer in trade law compared to other
fields). Even though there is a relationship between the ideology of law professors and
lawyers across the areas of expertise, there are comparatively fewer conservatives law
professors in almost every area of expertise. An extreme example of this is family law.
For family law, the majority of law professors lean to the left. For practicing lawyers,
however, the ideological distribution of family lawyers is much more bimodal, with a
larger proportion of conservative lawyers. In summary, law professors typically lean to
the left even compared to lawyers in the same area of expertise. Thus, differences in
ideology by subject matter expertise does not explain the entirety of the gap between
17

Lawyers listed in Martindale-Hubbell can list multiple practice areas. We operationalized our
coding of the area of expertise by including all lawyers listed for each practice area.
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lawyers and law professors.
4.4

Ideologies of Law Professors Compared to Law School Alumni
Law schools cultivate different ideological cultures, which may in turn relate

to the ideology of both students and professors. For example, it might be possible that
a legal education exerts an independent causal effect on ideology, with the teaching
and mentoring from more liberal professors leading to a more liberal alumni body (and
vice versa for conservative professors). Although we do not attempt to isolate any
mechanisms, a number of reasons could explain an ideological relationship between
professors at a law school and the law school’s alumni.
To assess the overall relationship between the ideologies of professors and
alumni at a law school, Figure 12 reports a binned scatterplot of the mean ideology
of law professors from a law school and the mean ideology of alumni from that law
school. One observes a strong positive correlation between the ideologies of professors
and alumni from law schools. A one unit increase in the mean CFscore of a law
school’s professors is associated with a 0.58 increase in the mean CFscore of a law
school’s alumni (p < 0.01).
Above we observed that differences in the average ideology of law professors
at a law school was driven mainly by the density of conservative professors at the
law school (rather than a shift in the ideology of liberal law professors). To assess
whether the same pattern is at play in the relationship of the mean professor and
alumni ideology at law schools, Figure 13 presents the ideological distributions of law
professors (solid line) and their schools’ alumni (dotted line) for each of the top 14 law
schools. The law school distributions are sorted by the difference between the median
ideology of law professors and alumni, e.g., the median alumni at Yale more closely
resemble the median law professor at Yale than the other schools. There are a number
of notable features of Figure 13. First, the median law professor is more liberal for each
law school than the median alumni. Although we only report the top 14 law schools
for space purposes, at seven law schools the median law professor is more conservative
than the median alumni.18 In other words, the median law professor at a law school
is only more conservative than the median alumni in roughly one out of every twenty
18

In increasing order of differences: Southern University Law Center (0.02), Regent University
(0.09), University of Memphis (Humphreys) (0.18), Loyola University New Orleans (0.24), Chapman
University (0.56), Pepperdine University (0.70), and George Mason University (1.57).
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law schools.
Second, the law schools with the most conservative alumni tend to be the
most dissimilar to law professors. For instance, the six law schools where there is
the largest professor-alumni gap have some of the most conservative alumni. For law
schools with a conservative median alumni, the median law professor is on average 0.98
CFscore points more liberal than the median alumni. Contrast this with the remaining
law schools that have a liberal median alumni, where the median law professor is 0.55
CFscore points more liberal than the median alumni. We investigate the relationship
between alumni ideologies and the ideological professor-alumni gap more formally in
Figure 14, which reports a binned scatterplot of the relationship. In the figure, a
larger difference between median alumni ideology and median professor ideology (the
y-axis) indicates that law professors are more liberal than alumni, e.g., small negative
CFscore for laywers (moderately liberal) minus a larger negative number for professors
(very liberal) implies a larger difference on the y-axis. An increasing difference implies
that law professors become more and more liberal relative to alumni as the alumni
become more conservative. We find a strong positive relationship: as alumni get more
conservative, the gap between professors and alumni increases. A one unit increase in
the median CFscore of alumni is associated with a 0.46 increase in the ideological gap
(p <0.01). In sum, the place that law professors are the most out of step with the
profession are in law schools that have relatively more conservative alumni.
4.5

Regression Analysis
We have seen that the ideologies of law professors and lawyers vary across

a number of dimensions, including law school affiliation and area of expertise. Above
we considered the relationship of law professor and lawyer ideology along different
dimensions in isolation. In this section, we put it all together and assess the extent
that law professors differ from lawyers after holding a number of important dimensions
fixed. In particular, we consider a specification in Equation (1).
yi = α + βpi + γs + δl + ζe + εi

(1)

where y is either individual i’s CFscore or an indicator for whether individual i is a
conservative (CFscore >0), pi denotes whether individual i is a professor, γs are state

17

of residence fixed effects, δl are law school fixed effects (where the individual attended
law school), and ζe are area of expertise fixed effects. The main coefficient of interest is
β. When an individual’s CFscore is the outcome, β estimates the average difference in
ideology between law professors and similar lawyers. When the outcome is whether an
individual is conservative, β estimates the percentage point gap between conservative
law professors and similar conservative lawyers.
Table 3 shows the results for the individuals CFscore and Table 4 shows
the results for whether the individual is a conservative. In each table, Column (1)
includes no controls, Column (2) adds area of expertise fixed effects, Column (3) adds
state of residence fixed effects, and Column (4) adds law school fixed effects. The point
estimate of -0.43 in Column (4) of Table 3 suggests that professors similar to lawyers in
terms of state of residence, law school, and area of expertise are on average more liberal
than lawyers an amount greater than the difference between Elizabeth Warren (-1.57)
and Barack Obama (-1.16). Column (4) of Table 4 suggests that there are 14ppt fewer
conservative law professors than similar lawyers. It is worth noting that where one
attended law school explains roughly 4ppt of the difference in conservatives between
professors and lawyers (comparing the point estimate in Column (3) to Column (4)).

5

Robustness Checks
In this section, we assess two ways in which the measure of ideology that we

utilize (the CFscore) might not adequately capture the ideological makeup of the legal
academy. First, we assess one concern about using political donations as a measure
of ideology for law professors in particular: that law professors donate to individuals
who run for office not on the basis of ideology. Second, we assess whether the use of
CFscores specifically, as opposed to any measure of ideology that is based on political
donations, influences the empirical patterns we observe.
5.1

Alternative Measures of Ideology
Above we have seen that law professors are politically active, with 64% of

professors donating to at least one political campaign from 1979 to 2014. One might
expect that law professors are friends, colleagues, or acquaintances of individuals who
run for office, and therefore could be donating to these individuals not because of
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ideology. If law professors donate to political candidates that come from the (liberal
leaning) legal profession, to the extent that law professors only make donations without
regard to ideology, law professors could be misclassified as liberal when they are in fact
conservative.
To assess this concern, we exploit the fact that donations made orthogonal
to ideology are more likely to be made to candidates for state or local office. This
is because law professors are less likely to know federal and presidential candidates.19
Insomuch that law professors are less likely to donate to federal candidates other than
for ideological reasons, consistent results would begin to alleviate the concern.
Figure 15 provides no evidence that the findings are sensitive to the type of
donations used to construct the CFscore. Panel A shows a strong relationship between
the CFscore based on all donations and the CFscore based on only federal donations
and (seperately) only presidential donations. Panel B plots the ideological distribution
of all three sets of CFscores, and provides no evidence that donations to state or local
elections bias CFscores to finding a more liberal legal academy.
5.2

Coarser Measure of Ideology
One of the main benefits of using the CFscore as a measure of ideology in

our setting is that it provides a continuous measure of ideology that can be used to
assess differences in the ideologies of law professors within the subset of liberal and
conservative professors. For instance, to the extent that law professors are part of a
political party, the continuous aspect of the CFscore allows us to assess differences
in the ideology of law professors within the political party. Another benefit is that
the CFscore can map donations made to candidates who do not run as part of the
Democratic or Republican party.
However, if law professors who are classified as liberal based on their CFscore
actually donate to candidates running as a Republican candidate or vice versa, one
might be concerned that the results based on CFscores go against more traditional
notions of ideology such as party affiliation. There is an appeal to using the simplistic
measure of ideology based on the political party as a robustness check. We therefore
use a more coarse measure of ideology to document the ideologies of law professors. In
19

Exceptions include the University of Chicago (because of Obama) and the University of Arkansas
(because of the Clinton’s).
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particular, the coarser alternative measure of ideology we use is whether a law professor
gave solely to candidates running on the republican ticket, solely to candidates running
on the democrat ticket, or both.
Figure 16 provides a political party breakdown of the mix of donations.
Panel A displays the breakdown for donations to all candidates. Panel B displays the
political party breakdown to presidential candidates. We find no evidence that the
CFscore overstates the liberal tilt of the legal academy.

6

Uniformity and Credibility
We now turn to examining the implications of having a predominately liberal

set of law professors. In particular, we focus on how the liberal slant of law professors
influences the political credibility of the legal academy. There are at least two situations in which the liberal tilt of the academy could influence the political credibility of
the legal academy (and thus the academy’s influence on public opinion). The first is
a marginalization concern. Specifically, because law professors are predominately leftleaning, they—and their arguments or recommendations—can be easily marginalized
or dismissed by conservatives as partisan or ideologically motivated. Because conservatives frequently occupy positions of political power, this means that the academy’s
influence could be severely limited. The second is a coalition-building concern. Given
the significant scarcity of conservative faculty, building a coalition that includes conservatives in large enough numbers to have credible influence is difficult. Indeed, we
found that liberal law professors outnumber conservative law professors nearly 7 to 1.
Extrapolating to the entire population of law professors (not just those who donate),
we would expect that, in 2012, there were roughly 1,500 conservative law professors
in the entire country. This suggests that crafting any kind of ideologically diverse
coalition would be extremely difficult.
To illustrate how its liberal tilt could stymie the legal academy’s influence,
we provide an illustration from the nomination of Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) by
President Donald J. Trump to the post of U.S. Attorney General in 2017. Sessions
was, at the time of his nomination, a highly controversial figure. He not only had
previously weathered a failed nomination to the federal district court in 1986, scuttled
when racially controversial comments came to light, but he also had a reputation for

20

being extremely conservative. This was in part based on Sessions’ opposition to gay
rights, the Violence Against Women Act, and hate crimes protection for women and
minorities (Zapotosky et al., 2017). In addition, many on the left viewed him as holding
deeply troubling, racist views (Nakashima and Horwitz, 2016).
In early January 2017, two months after Sessions was nominated, a group
of over one thousand law professors posted an open letter to the Senate Judiciary
Committee opposing the nomination and calling on members of the committee to reject him.20 The letter was widely circulated on social media and specifically cited the
letter writers’ status as law professors in opposing Sessions. “As law professors who
work every day to better understand the law and teach it to our students,” the letter
stated, “we are convinced that Jeff Sessions will not fairly enforce our nation’s laws
and promote justice and equality in the United States.” The signatories included professors from the most prestigious universities in the country (including Harvard, Yale,
and Stanford), as well as professors from law schools perceived as more conservative
(including Texas A&M University and Stetson University).
Perhaps contrary to the intent of the letter writers, the Sessions letter was
quickly dismissed by conservatives precisely because it was written by law professors.21
A spokeswoman for Jeff Sessions rejected the letter as “just business as usual for the
same far-left academics who trot out letters opposing just about any conservative or
Republican who’s nominated to a key position by a Republican president” (Johnson,
2017). The letter also was dismissed by public observers and conservative journalists.
For example, one opinion piece for the Chicago Tribune blasted the “pious pontification
of the law professoriate,” with the author—himself a law professor—stating that “[t]he
exaggerated self-importance of the teacher of law is buttressed by immersion in an
ideology very different from what most senators and most Americans believe about the
law in particular and the world in general.”
Reception among Republican lawmakers was equally skeptical. One Republican member of the Senate Judiciary Comittee, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC),
rhetorically asked of Sessions during his hearings:
We’re about to get an answer to the age-old question: Can you get con20

A copy of the letter can be found at https://docs.google.com/document/d/167Ci3pVqwzOUe7_
e7itlpew1qGcTo0ZD5dNICIbLQWA/pub (accessed January 17, 2016, 2:58pm ET).
21
At the time of the Sessions nomination in January 2017, Republicans controlled both chambers
of Congress, as well as the White House.
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firmed attorney general of the United States over the objection of 1,400 law
professors? I don’t know what the betting line is in Vegas, but I like your
chances.
This statement was met with laughter from the audience. Sessions was ultimately
confirmed by a vote of 52 to 47. (Sessions, himself a U.S. Senator at the time of the
vote, was present but did not vote.)
Was this swift dismissal of the letter indeed rooted in the ideology of the
letter writers? To assess the ideological makeup of the letter’s signatories, we matched
the names of the signers to their CFscores.22 We were able to match 754 of them to the
law professor names from the 2012 AALS data. (The law professors who we were unable
to match could have retired by 2012, switched law schools from 2012 and 2016, or not
have been a professor yet in 2012.) Assuming that those matched are representative of
those we were unable to match, we find a significant difference between the ideologies
of professors who signed the Sessions letter and the ideologies of professors who did not
sign the Sessions letter. To illustrate this, Figure 17 plots the ideological distributions
for professors who signed the letter and those that did not. For the law professors who
signed the letter, the average CFscore is -1.20, compared to -0.82 for professors who
did not sign. In addition, whereas 16% of law professors who did not sign the Sessions
letter are conservative, only 4% of law professors who signed the letter are conservative.
These differences in means are highly significant (p <0.001). Thus, we can conclude
that those who signed the anti-Sessions letter were (1) more liberal on average, and
(2) not ideologically representative of law professors in our sample overall.23
Even though we can provide no empirical evidence about the possible influence of the legal academy under a counterfactual in which conservatives were
more strongly represented, the Sessions example suggests that ideological homogeneity
might be causing the legal professoriate to have more limited influence than it might
otherwise—particularly in an increasingly politically polarized environment. The normative implications are significant. Numerous law professors file briefs before state
22

This analysis is in part inspired by McGinnis et al. (2005)’s examination of the ideology of law
professors from 21 law schools who signed a letter criticizing the Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in
Bush v. Gore. In Figure A2 in the Appendix, we reexamine the signatories of that letter with our
more comprehensive dataset. We were able to match 65% of the Bush v. Gore signatories to the
AALS data; of the donors, we classify 4% as conservative.
23
We note that the letter did not include professors from several conservative law schools (by our
measures as well as the popular understanding) such as George Mason University, the University of
Notre Dame, or Brigham Young University.
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and federal courts, and many others weigh in on important policy issues in public fora
and on social media. The Sessions example, and our analysis, suggests that the impact
of these activities might be undermined by the professoriate’s ideological homogeneity. To this extent, the introduction of more ideological diversity could strengthen,
rather than undermine, the legal academy’s influence. We turn to an investigation of
increasing ideological diversity in the next section.

7

Tradeoffs
The above discussion suggests that increasing the ideological diversity within

the legal academy could serve to increase its influence among decision makers and members of the public. However, a possible concern with hiring on the basis of ideology
more broadly, and of promoting the hiring of conservative law professors specifically,
is whether there could exist spillover effects that negatively affect other hiring prerogatives. For example, many law schools have made the hiring of faculty from underrepresented demographic groups a strong priority.
In this section, we begin to explore how recruiting more conservative faculty
might relate to hiring prerogatives aimed at increasing the representation of underrepresented minorities and women. To do so, we use information from the 2012 AALS
directory that identifies 1,417 minority professors24 and we obtain the gender of law
professors from the biography section of the 2012 AALS directory. Law schools have
made significant progress in recent decades towards increasing the number of minority
and female law professors. To give some context, we find that minorities (females)
account for 15% (35%) of law professors hired post-2002, up from 10% (27%) hired
before 2002.
We first compare the ideologies of minority law professors to the ideologies of
non-minority law professors. Panel A of Figure 18 plots the ideologies of law professors
identified in the AALS minority list against the ideologies of law professors not on the
minority list. The mean CFscore for law professors on the AALS minority list is -1.02,
compared to -0.83 for law professors not on the AALS minority list. Furthermore,
24

To our knowledge, the AALS does not publish the criteria for determining minority status,
meaning that we do not know how the list was created or the AALS’ definition of “minority.” In
addition, we have no information on these professors’ racial or ethnic identification (for example,
African American, Latino/a, etc.). The list is, however, actively used by law schools.
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10% of law professors on the AALS minority list are conservative, compared to 16%
of law professors not on the AALS minority list. Both comparisons are statistically
significant (p <0.01). As a complement comparison, we note that whereas 13% of
liberal law professors are on the AALS list of minority law professors, only 8% of
conservatives are. This difference is also statistically significant (p <0.01).
We next compare the ideologies of female law professors to the ideologies of
male law professors. Roughly 30% of law professors are female in the sample. Panel B
of Figure 18 plots the ideologies of law professors that we can identify as female in the
AALS against the ideologies of law professors that we can identify as male. The mean
CFscore for female law professors is -1.06, compared to -0.78 for male law professors.
In addition, 9% of female law professors are conservative, compared to 18% of male
law professors. Both comparisons are statistically significant (p <0.01).
The finding that minority and women law professors are, on average, more
liberal than their white male counterparts is not surprising. What is perhaps surprising,
however, is how few law professors, regardless of background, are conservative. We
estimate that just 19% of white male law professors are conservative. To give some
national-level context from the same time period, Republican nominee Mitt Romney
won 62% of the white male vote in the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election.
Were we to assume that liberal and conservative graduates of elite law schools
are of similar quality and apply for academic positions at similar rates during this period, it would suggest that hiring committees could expect to receive on the order
of five applications from liberals for every one application from conservatives. This
ratio alone could present a logistical challenge to a school looking to recruit more conservative faculty. However, the challenge is compounded by the relationship between
traditionally underrepresented groups and a more conservative ideology. For instance,
our data suggest that 12 out of every hundred recent graduates of elite law schools are
conservative and, of those 12, we estimate that nine are men and three are women.
Prioritizing hiring from a group in which men outnumber women three to one without
negatively affecting the gender balance of new hires would likely prove challenging.
Before concluding, we would like to emphasize that these analyses highlight potential
tradeoffs but do not conclusively demonstrate that such tradeoffs would necessarily follow. After all, whom a law school hires is intimately related to its rank, the preferences
of its existing faculty, and the available pool of potential applicants.
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8

Concluding Remarks
We made several contributions to the empirical literature on the ideological

balance of the legal academy. First, we have provided the most detailed study to date of
the ideological leanings of the legal academy. We matched 10,040 law professors listed
in the 2012 AALS Directory of Law Teachers to the Database on Ideology, Money and
Politics, and Elections, a comprehensive database of political ideology that is based on
political donations. Law professors are quite liberal, especially at top programs and in
progressive teaching areas. Using a continuous measure of law professors’ ideologies,
we found evidence that the liberal tilt of the legal academy is primarily the result of the
relative scarcity of conservatives, as opposed to a more leftward shift in liberal faculty.
Second, we formally assessed the ideological balance of the legal academy to that of
the relevant legal profession. We found that 15% of law professors, compared to 35%
of lawyers, are conservative. After controlling for individual characteristics, however,
this 20 percentage point ideological gap narrowed to around 13 percentage points.
We note several limitations of our study. First, we are only able to observe
the ideology of the 64% of law professors in the 2012 AALS who made political donations. It is possible that conservatives and liberals donate at different rates, and, as
a result, using political donations as a measure of ideology understates or overstates
the degree to which the legal academy leans left. Second, political donations may not
perfectly capture the true ideologies of all law professors. An individual who donates
to Democrats, for example, might still have conservative ideological views, while an
individual who donates to Republicans might hold liberal views. Third, the motivations for donating might differ between law professors and lawyers, which could bias
the inferences stemming from the use of donations as a measure of ideology in assessing
the ideological balance of the legal academy to that of the legal profession.
We also note several avenues of future research. As we noted in our introduction, our analysis here was purely descriptive in nature. This was in part due to
data limitations (e.g., we do not have data on law professor candidates as in George
and Yoon (2014) or on specific outcomes). However, we feel that the question of what
causes these patterns is ripe for future examinations. Specifically, we note two possible causal explanations. One is ideological discrimination against conservatives. A
handful of papers raised the possibility that hiring committees in law schools implicitly
or explicitly discriminate against candidates who are conservative (e.g., Merritt, 1998;
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Cardiff and Klein, 2005; McGinnis et al., 2005; Lindgren, 2016; Phillips, 2016). Although discrimination against conservatives, if it exists, might be a sufficient condition
to explain the imbalance, it is not a necessary condition.
A second possible explanation is ideological sorting—that is, conservative
lawyers might be less likely to pursue an academic career. For instance, Fisman et al.
(2015) ran a survey experiment on the distributional preferences of Yale law students
and found that law students pursuing academic or nonprofit positions exhibit stronger
preferences for redistribution and are less likely to be conservative. This is one piece
of evidence suggesting that academic career paths may be less desirable to conservative lawyers. Additionally, given the limited supply of conservative lawyers with elite
credentials, it is possible that many who would have otherwise become law professors
choose alternative career paths. For example, roughly half of all judicial vacancies are
filled by Republicans (Posner, 2016). If elite conservative lawyers consider a career in
the judiciary or a career in academia, the fact that elite liberal lawyers outnumber
elite conservative lawyers on a magnitude of roughly 3:1 implies that Republican-led
judicial recruiting could crowd out highly qualified conservatives from academia.
We conclude by considering the broader implications of this analysis. Law
professors frequently weigh in on important political, policy, and legal issues—including
delivering oral arguments, testifying before lawmakers, writing op-eds, and lobbying.
However, although the legal academy is highly varied in its passions, intellectual approaches, and academic and non-academic interests, our analysis here showed that
these voices tend toward the more liberal end of the spectrum, with relatively few
conservative voices. From the perspective of the academy’s influence, this could be
problematic. As of this writing in 2017, conservatives control over two-thirds of all
state governorships and state legislative assemblies; at the federal level, conservatives
control all three branches of government. In terms of public opinion, roughly 35%
of Americans in 2014 identified as “conservative” or “very conservative” compared to
24% who identified as liberal (37% as moderate) (Saad, 2016). These realities put the
legal academy out of step with both political decision makers (at federal and state
governments) and the general public, raising the possibility that the intellectual and
public contributions of the legal academy could be dismissed as partisan. One possible path forward includes more ideological diversity in law hiring; as we noted here,
however, this might not be straightforward, especially given many school’s concerns
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about promoting gender and racial diversity. Nonetheless, this analysis gave us reason
to think that including more ideologically diverse voices might ultimately increase the
legal academy’s influence.
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Figures and Tables
Table 1: Previous Studies on the Ideologies of Law Professors

Name
of Study

Sample
and Measure

Merritt (1998)

Entry-Level Hires 832
from 1986 to 1991,
Survey

75% liberal, 10%
conservative

Cardiff and Klein (2005)

Non-random
set 254
of California Law
Schools,
Voter
registration records

80% Democrats,
20%
Republicans

McGinnis et al. (2005)

Top 21 law schools, 1,215
Rank of assistant,
associate, or full
professor as of the
2001-2002 school
year, Political Donations from 1992
to 2002

81% Democrats,
15%
Republicans

Lindgren (2016)

Survey in 1997 710
of Top 100 law
schools,
Party
Identification

80% considered
themselves to be
Democrats, and
13% considered
themselves to be
Republicans

Phillips (2016)

Top 16 law schools, 1,011
Full-time tenuretrack faculty for
the
2011-2012
school year

86%
Liberal,
14%
Conservative
or
Libertarian
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Figure 2: Average Ideology of Law Professors by Subject Area
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Figure 3: Ideologies of Law Professors by Subject Area
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Figure 4: Average Ideology of Law Professors By Law School
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Figure 5: Ideologies of Law Professors by Law School
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<150

100

50

Law School Rank

37

1

0
-.5
-1.5

-1

Mean CFscore

.5

1

Figure 7: Polarization versus Presence of Conservatives by Law School Rank
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Table 2: Law Professors by Law School Attended

Professor
Alumni
Harvard
Yale
Columbia
Michigan
Chicago
NYU
Georgetown
Stanford
Berkeley
Virginia
Pennsylvania
Northwestern
Duke
Cornell
All Other

Market
Share (%)

Mean
CFscore

Proportion
Conservative (%)

12
9
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
49

-0.98
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-0.72
-1.06
-1.01
-0.95
-1.02
-0.83
-0.87
-1.04
-0.64
-0.84
-0.76
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Figure 8: Ideologies of Law Professors Compared Lawyers
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Figure 9: Ideologies of Law Professors Compared to Elite Lawyers and Other Academics
Panel A: Top 14 Law Schools and Big Law Panel B: Federal Clerks
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Figure 10: Average Ideology of Law Professors and Lawyers by Subject Area

Figure 11: Ideologies of Law Professors and Lawyers by Subject Area
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Figure 12: Average Ideology of Law Professors and Alumni
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Figure 13: Ideologies of Law Professors and Alumni
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Table 3: Difference in Ideology Between Law Professors and Lawyers

CFscore
(1)
Professor

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.55∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.02)

Covariates
Subject Area FE
State FE
Law School FE
Obs
R-squared
Dep Var Mean

No
No
No

Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

366,519
0.007
-0.32

366,519
0.021
-0.32

366,519
0.134
-0.32

366,519
0.159
-0.32

Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses (by law school
attended). ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table 4: Difference in Presence of Conservative Law Professors and Lawyers

Conservative
(1)
Professor

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.20∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)

Covariates
Subject Area FE
State FE
Law School FE
Obs
R-squared
Dep Var Mean

No
No
No

Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

366,519
0.003
0.35

366,519
0.014
0.35

366,519
0.091
0.35

366,519
0.111
0.35

Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses (by law school
attended). ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Figure 15: Alternative Measures of Ideology
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B. Ideologies of Law Professors using Alternative Measures of Ideology
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Figure 16: Donations to Presidential Candidates by Political Party
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Figure 17: Ideologies of Law Professors Opposing Jeff Sessions Confirmation
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Figure 18: Ideologies of Minority Law Professors
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Appendix

Figure A1: Ideologies of Law Professors by Law School Rank (Rank in Parentheses)
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Figure A2: Ideology of Professors who Signed the Bush v. Gore Letter
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Table A1: Grouping of Practice Areas and Teaching Areas
Attorney
Practice Area
Election Law
Government Law
Legislative Practice
Nonprofits
Public Law
Public Utility Law
Utility Law

Law Professor
Teaching Area
Administrative Law
Government Contracts
Legislation
Local Government

Antitrust

Antitrust
Covenants not to Compete
Mergers and Acquisitions
Unfair Competition

Antitrust

Bankruptcy

Bankruptcy

Bankruptcy

Commercial

Banking Finance
Business Corporate
Closely held Corporations
Corporation Law
Corporations
Franchise Law
Hospital Law
Joint Ventures
Limited Liability Company
Partnerships
Secured Transactions

Agency and Partnership
Business Associations
Commercial Law
Commercial Paper
Corporate Finance
Financial Institutions
Law and Accounting
Payment Systems
Securities Regulation

Field
Administrative Law

Constitutional Law

Constitutional Law

Consumer

Americans with Disabilities
Birth Trauma
Collections
Consumer Law
Health
Insurance Law

Consumer Law
Health Care Law
Insurance Law
Products Liability
Remedies

Contracts

Breach of Contract
Contract Law
Contracts

Contracts

Criminal

Capital Offenses
Criminal
Drivers License Suspension

Criminal Justice
Criminal Law
Criminal Procedure
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Table A1: Grouping of Practice Areas and Teaching Areas
Attorney
Practice Area
DUI
Expungements
Extortion
Forgery
Fraud
Harassment
Hit and Run
Money Laundering
Parole and Probation
Sexual Abuse
Stalking
White Collar
Wire Fraud

Law Professor
Teaching Area

Employment

Labor Employment

Disability Law
Employee Benefit Plans
Employment Discrimination
Labor Law
Workers Compensation

Entertainment

Entertainment

Entertainment Law
Sports Law

Environmental

Agricultural Law
Energy
Environmental
Transportation

Agricultural Law
Energy Law
Environmental Law
Natural Resources
Ocean Resources
Oil and Gas
Water Rights

Evidence

Appeals
Civil Practice
Civil Trial
Federal Practice
Litigation
Postconviction Remedies
Trial Practice
Trials

Evidence
Jurisprudence

Family

Annulment
Cohabitation Agreements
Conservatorship

Family Law

Field
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Table A1: Grouping of Practice Areas and Teaching Areas
Attorney
Practice Area
Custody
Equitable Distribution
Family Law
Grandparents Custody
Grandparents Visitation Rights
Parental Rights
Post-nuptial Agreements
Visitation Rights

Law Professor
Teaching Area

Individual Rights

Civil Rights
Collective Bargaining
Disabilities
Education Law
Elder Law
Habeas Corpus
Search and Seizure

Civil Rights
Critical Legal Studies
Critical Race Theory
Education Law
Elder Law
Feminist Legal Theory
Human Rights
Juvenile Law
Poverty Law
Welfare Law
Women and the Law

Intellectual Property

Computer Law
Intellectual Property
Trade Secrets

Computers and the Law
Intellectual Property

International

Immigration
International

Aviation and Space Law
Comparative Law
International Law

Legal Profession

Professional Liability
Professional Negligence

Clinical Teaching
Federal Courts
Judicial Administration
Law Office Management
Legal Research and Writing
Professional Responsibility

Military

Defense Law
Military

Military Law
National Security Law

Native

Indian Law

Native American Law

Procedure

Mediation

Alternative Dispute Resolution
Appellate Practice

Field
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Table A1: Grouping of Practice Areas and Teaching Areas
Attorney
Practice Area

Law Professor
Teaching Area
Civil Procedure
Legal Drafting
Legal Method
Trial Advocacy

Property

Boundary Disputes
Community Association Law
Community Property Law
Condemnation
Condominium Association Law
Condominium Law
Easements
Estate Settlements
Leases and Leasing
Leasing
Premises Liability
Property Law
Restraining Orders
Successions
Wealth Preservation

Community Property
Estate Planning
Estates and Trusts
Property

Tax

Tax

Estate and Gift Tax
Tax Policy
Taxation Corporate
Taxation Federal
Taxation State Local

Torts

Animal Attacks
Automobile Liability
Automobile Negligence
Civil Liability
Cumulative Trauma
Medical Malpractice
Medical Malpractice Defense
Negligence
Negligence Law
Nursing Home Negligence
Personal Injury
Product Defects
Property Damage
Tort Liability
Torts
Toxic Tort

Torts

Field
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Table A1: Grouping of Practice Areas and Teaching Areas
Attorney
Practice Area
Whiplash

Law Professor
Teaching Area

Trade

Admiralty Maritime
Aviation
Aviation Law
Interstate Support

Admiralty
Communications Law
Conflict of Laws
Immigration Law
International Organizations
Intl Business Transactions
Regulated Industries
Trade Regulation

Transactional

Appellate Practice
Buysell Agreements
Construction Law
Estate Planning
Land Use
Mechanics Liens
Name Changes
Powers of Attorney
Real Estate
Subrogation
Surety Law
Transactions

Creditors and Debtors Rights
Land Use Planning
Real Estate Transactions

Field
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